“Human security insists that we focus on the safety of ordinary people rather than on the security of states.” The Canadian government in the 1990’s was an exuberant advocate for the human security paradigm. The Canadian government along with like-minded governments worked hard to endeavour the human security agenda. Meetings were organized that pushed the idea of a people-centered foreign policy, and many other measures were taken.
Canada’s foreign minister from 1996 to 2000, Lloyd Axworthy, strived to adjust the idea of security. He wanted to put more focus on the idea of the safety of the people rather than the security of states. He embraced human security as a primary goal of Canadian foreign policy. With the aid of the Norwegian foreign minister, Knut Vollebaek, Axworthy was able to negotiate the Lysoen Declaration.
Knowing that the Canadian government had such a strong grasp on the human security paradigm it is difficult to understand Ottawa’s response to the violence in East Timor in September of 1999. The Canadian government eventually did respond by contributing troops to the international force. However, it was “slow, cautious, and minimalist.”
It is understood that the Canadian government had access to the same information that other western countries did regarding the readiness of the TNI-backed militias to use force in East Timor. However, the Canadian government lacked what was outlined by the human security agenda. And did not follow the Australian government’s action into East Timor.
On September 7, 1999, the Canadian government was abrupt to renounce reports that they would join the “coalition of the willing”. Prime minister, Chretien, stated that “Canada is always considering any difficult situation, but we are not there yet.” Chretien wanted the Indonesian governments consent before deploying foreign troops to East Timor.
The Canadian government did however, consent that if it was absolutely necessary to send peacekeepers to East Timor, Canada would do that under certain conditions:-The contribution would be small. (Canada had commitments elsewhere)-There would not be a contribution made apart from the multilateral arrangement.
However, On September 12, 1999, Chretien publicly announced that Canada would be taking part in the East Timor intervention force. He promised 600 troops. Cretien left the impression that Canada would be promising 600 infantry troops to the mission. When he was really promising 250 naval personnel, 100 aircrew, 50 logistical and medical support, and 200 infantry. I believe that Chretiens misconception was planned in order to deceive the international community. As Chretiens misconception sounds more helpful than his true intentions. Realpolitk? I think so.
By September 15th the Canadian government began to finalize their contribution. However, the Canadian troops did not deploy until the end of October. I believe that this happened due to the fact that the Canadian government did not want to put their own people at risk. Again Realpolitik.
Canada gave the impression that they had the motive, and the resources to help East Timor. So, the ongoing question is, why didn’t the Canadian government take a more active role in the situation in East Timor?
One argument is that Canada’s caution was due to their economic interests and their relationship with Indonesia. Others are that Canada had little interest in East Timor’s independence. However, they were pushed to help as a direct result of public opinion, media attention, and the NGO community. Another explanation for Canada’s “slow, cautious, and minimalist” role was that the Canadian government did not buy into Lloyd Axworthy’s human security agenda.
The Canadian government has even admitted that the country’s contribution to East Timor was put into action in order to boost the country’s international image. Not to aid the humanitarian issue. Chretien stated that “And we are happy and Canadians love it. They think it is a nice way for Canadians to be present around the world.”
The crisis in East Timor conveys the limits of the human security agenda, and how it is easier for governments to “embrace the rhetoric of human security than it is to transform the human security agenda into concrete policy initiatives.” It is obvious that the Canadian government could have contributed more to the crisis in East Timor. However, I believe that the country’s greater interest was their own personal accomplishment. The Canadian government’s contributions to the crisis in East Timor strongly conveys Niccolo Machiavelli’s beliefs, as they were selfish.
Canada’s foreign minister from 1996 to 2000, Lloyd Axworthy, strived to adjust the idea of security. He wanted to put more focus on the idea of the safety of the people rather than the security of states. He embraced human security as a primary goal of Canadian foreign policy. With the aid of the Norwegian foreign minister, Knut Vollebaek, Axworthy was able to negotiate the Lysoen Declaration.
Knowing that the Canadian government had such a strong grasp on the human security paradigm it is difficult to understand Ottawa’s response to the violence in East Timor in September of 1999. The Canadian government eventually did respond by contributing troops to the international force. However, it was “slow, cautious, and minimalist.”
It is understood that the Canadian government had access to the same information that other western countries did regarding the readiness of the TNI-backed militias to use force in East Timor. However, the Canadian government lacked what was outlined by the human security agenda. And did not follow the Australian government’s action into East Timor.
On September 7, 1999, the Canadian government was abrupt to renounce reports that they would join the “coalition of the willing”. Prime minister, Chretien, stated that “Canada is always considering any difficult situation, but we are not there yet.” Chretien wanted the Indonesian governments consent before deploying foreign troops to East Timor.
The Canadian government did however, consent that if it was absolutely necessary to send peacekeepers to East Timor, Canada would do that under certain conditions:-The contribution would be small. (Canada had commitments elsewhere)-There would not be a contribution made apart from the multilateral arrangement.
However, On September 12, 1999, Chretien publicly announced that Canada would be taking part in the East Timor intervention force. He promised 600 troops. Cretien left the impression that Canada would be promising 600 infantry troops to the mission. When he was really promising 250 naval personnel, 100 aircrew, 50 logistical and medical support, and 200 infantry. I believe that Chretiens misconception was planned in order to deceive the international community. As Chretiens misconception sounds more helpful than his true intentions. Realpolitk? I think so.
By September 15th the Canadian government began to finalize their contribution. However, the Canadian troops did not deploy until the end of October. I believe that this happened due to the fact that the Canadian government did not want to put their own people at risk. Again Realpolitik.
Canada gave the impression that they had the motive, and the resources to help East Timor. So, the ongoing question is, why didn’t the Canadian government take a more active role in the situation in East Timor?
One argument is that Canada’s caution was due to their economic interests and their relationship with Indonesia. Others are that Canada had little interest in East Timor’s independence. However, they were pushed to help as a direct result of public opinion, media attention, and the NGO community. Another explanation for Canada’s “slow, cautious, and minimalist” role was that the Canadian government did not buy into Lloyd Axworthy’s human security agenda.
The Canadian government has even admitted that the country’s contribution to East Timor was put into action in order to boost the country’s international image. Not to aid the humanitarian issue. Chretien stated that “And we are happy and Canadians love it. They think it is a nice way for Canadians to be present around the world.”
The crisis in East Timor conveys the limits of the human security agenda, and how it is easier for governments to “embrace the rhetoric of human security than it is to transform the human security agenda into concrete policy initiatives.” It is obvious that the Canadian government could have contributed more to the crisis in East Timor. However, I believe that the country’s greater interest was their own personal accomplishment. The Canadian government’s contributions to the crisis in East Timor strongly conveys Niccolo Machiavelli’s beliefs, as they were selfish.